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Abstract :
The concept of statistical pessimism is introduced as it relates to the
estimation of an unknown population parameter. Samples dravm from the popula-
tion are then ordered on the basis of sample size in terms of increasing
pessimism regarding the parameter value. Such an ordering can be achieved
for a broad class of distributional parameters. The ordering is applied to
bidding theory in order to explain why an individual bidder might adopt less
aggressive behavior as the number of competitors increases.
The author wishes to thank Edward Rice for helpful
suggestions.
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ON PESSIMISTIC SAMPLES, WITH APPLICATIONS TO BIDDING THEORY
1. INTRODUCTION
The laws of statistical inference provide a useful technique for
assessing the magnitude of an unknown population parameter, 6, based
on a limited set of sample data. The essence of this process is that
our posterior assessment will be related in systematic fashion to a
set of data sampled from the parent distribution, $(5i6). It is clear,
intuitively, that the indication given by the sample will be more or
less pessimistic regarding 9 depending on the particular data points
obtained. The purpose of the present paper is to consider what
meaningful notion one can attach to the term "pessimistic" in this
context, and to consequently determine which samples drawn from the
population may be regarded as pessimistic.
There are several definitions of pessimism that might be used.
For example, it could be said that one sample, denoted by the vector f;-
,
is more pessimistic than another,
^^,
if the posterior mean of the
conditional distribution of 8 resulting from the first sample is the
smaller:
/ e-iccelcjde < f e-^piel^jaQ. (i.i)
— 00 —CO
Essentially, this definition consists of an ordering of the possible
samples in terms of their effect on the posterior expectation of the
unknown parameter. Alternative definitions could be expressed similarly
in terms of the sample's effect on the posterior median, mode, etc.
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As a stroiiger criterion for pessimism, one may invoke the property
of stochastic dominance, in which case the first sample is understood to
be the more pessimistic only if:
9 e
for all values of 8. That is, pessimism may require that the conditional
probability of the parameter value exceeding any given magnitude be no
greater under the first sample than the second. This is a much stronger
criterion than the first, and therefore more useful. Accordingly » we
focus on it throughout the remainder.
The main result obtained is to show that it is generally possible
to establish an ordering on the sample space induced by ^U\Q) in terms
of our strong definition of pessimism for a relatively broad class of
distributional parameters. A theorem to this effect is presented in
Section 2. In Section 3 an important application is made to the economic
theory of competitive bidding behavior.
2, A THEOREM ON ORDERING
We focus on a situation where the available sampling information
is limited to the sample size, n, and the maximum value obtained, n. It
is assumed that the sample points which determine n are identically and
independently distributed with distribution function ^(K\Q) , indexed by
parameter 8. The theorem then states that if 6 belongs to the class
which orders the family of distributions $(5!©) in terms of stochastic
dominance, it is then possible to order the family of posterior distribution
functions 4'(9lri,n) in terms of stochastic dominance. The class is,
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of course, already familiar as that noted in Lehiiiann's second category
of well-ordered distributions (1955, p. 400). Our theorem and its proof
follow.
Theorem
Let (C, , . .
.
, ? ) represent an independently and identically
1 n
distributed sample drawn from the parent distribution ^(E.\q):, this
being one of a family indexed by parameter 6, and having continuous
density (p(S|8). Let n represent the maximum value obtained in the
sample. Finally, let 't'CSJri.n) represent the posterior distribution of
9 conditional on the sample information (Ti,n), and itself having continuous
density ii>(e|n,n). Then, if ^C^JO ) >_ $(5^2^ ^°^ ^^^ ^' "^^^^^ ®i "^ ®2' "
it follows that 4'(biri,n ) >^ 'H(e|r)>n ) for all 6, with n^ > n .
Proof
The theorem is established by proving the somewhat stronger
^"if,Kjs±tiQn that, for n-i^ > n2 , there exists some value 6' for which:
ij)(ejn,n ) < ii;(eiri,n„) if and only if > 6'. (2.1)
This implies that the posterior densities are "simply intertwined" in
the sense of Hammond (1974, p. 1052), with exactly one intersection at
the point 6 ' . The theorem follows immediately from this property of
the posterior densities.
We begin by writing the likelihood of the extreme value, conditional
on e and n:
L(ni8,n) = n-<i>(ni6).[$(nle)]"'-^. (2.2)
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The posterior density of 8, conditional on ri and n, may then be
expressed as
:
(n|6>-[*(n|6)l''"V(9) .,.1 „^
*(e|n,n) - ^ ^ - i^^ ; (2.3)
/ 'J>(n!8)-[4>(n|e)]"~-'^(6)de
—QO
where ij^(e) represents the prior distribution of 6; and where we have
replaced the numerator and denominator in the final expression by the
terms A(6|Ti,n) and B(n,n), respectively.
To establish (2.1) we evaluate the pattern of change in the
posterior density i})(6in,n) brought about by variations in n. Specifically,
we demonstrate the existence of a value 6' for which:
~\(»(9|n,n) > 0, if and only if 6 < 6'. (2.4)
The derivative in (2.4) is evaluated using (2.3):
A 'B - A»B
~np(0|r).n) = -^^~ ' a a A -B - A-B ; (2.5)
on ' 2 n n
where A = 3/8n [A(ejn,n)], etc. Evaluating the right side of (2.5)
yields:
+«>
^(6in,n) « {())(ni6)«t|;(e)-[$(r)ie)]""^ln[0(nie)]}-{ / <j)(n|G)-!;/(e)-[«>(ii|6)]'''~^dG}
- { / <|'(ri|B)-*(e).[*(n|6)]"~^in[$(n!e)]d0}.{<b(n|e)-ii'(9)-[$(n!e)]'' ^}; (2.5)
— 00
which becomes, after factoring:
~ij^(e|n,n) « {4'(n|e)'<|'(e).[$(nie)]'^~-^}-{ln[$(ni_e)]. / (|>(?ije^)-^|i(e)-[*(nij.)3''~'''dQ,
,n-l
/ 4'(ni6)-il.(e)-[$(r,je)] • ln[$(ni6)]de}. (2,7)
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The leading bracket in (2.7) is clearly non-negative. Therefore,
3/9n [ij>(9 jri>n)] takes the sign of the second bracket. Two remarks are
sufficient to determine this sign.
Remark 1: The sign cannot be uniformly positive (negative) for all
values of 6, for then the derivative would be positive
(negative) throughout, v/hlch is impossible for any
proper density function.
Remark 2: The value in the second bracket depends on 8 only
through the term: ln['J>(rii 9) ] . It must then be
monotonically decreasing in 9 for fixed n> because we
have assumed 'I'(tiJ9) to be.
From this it follows that a point 9' exists such that 8/3n ['^(6JTi,n] >
as 9 < 9'. By the continuity of i|j(9in5n) it follows that iJ;(9Jri»n ) <
if.(6iti,n„) as e > 9'. QED.
The ordering of posterior distribution functions established by the
theorem has many potential applications. Perhaps its most basic use is
to substantiate the intuitive notion that obtaining extreme value n from
a sample of size n is a more pessimistic indication regarding the mean of
a normal population than if the extreme had been obtained from any smaller
sample size. However, the normal mean is but one member of the class G.
Others include the upper bound of the uniform distribution over the
interval (a,b); the location parameter (g) of the Weibull distribution:
$(5) = 1 - exp[-(^/g) ]; and the mean, variance, and all percentile
points of the exponential distribution. An im.portant application of the
class to the economic theory of competitive bidding is described in
the next section.
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3. AN APPLICATION TO BIDDING THEORY
A curious result found in the literature on
competitive bidding
is that the behavior of each participant in a sealed-bid
auction market
is likely to become less aggressive as the total
number of participants
increases (Ca?en, Clapp, and Campbell, 1971; Dougherty
and Nozaki, 1975;
Zinn, Lesso, and Givens, 1975; and Reece, 1977). In the
context of a
seller's auction , in which some item of value is to be
awarded to the
highest bidder, this result implies that an individual
bidder will, in
response to additional competition, reduce the amount of
his bid and
thereby diminish his chance of winning. The rationale
for this seemingly
paradoxical behavior has remained obscure, principally because
the
studies which argue in its favor consist of computer-based
simulation
models that do not fully reveal the mechanism or incentives
that induce
such behavior. The theorem we have presented above can be
applied to
make these factors clear.
Following the simulation studies, we assume the bidder is
offered
some item of value, v. In order to be successful he
must enter a bid. b,
in excess of the amount of the highest competing bid, z.
We assume the
bidder's expectations regarding v and z, which are generally
subject to
uncertainty, can be summarized by the subjective joint probability
density. f(v,z|n). This density is conditioned by n, the number of
competing bidders, to reflect the influence which this parameter
exerts
on the distribution of the highest competing bid.
Since the bidder's competitors will select their bids in
accordance
with whatever Information they have regarding the item's
underlying value,
the random variables v and z will not in general be independent.
For
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example, it is likely that if the amount of the highest competing bid
were revealed to our bidder before the auction took place, this would
convey additional information regarding v, and his appraisal of the item's
value would be subsequently revised. Therefore, we cannot factor the
joint density Into the product of marginal densities: £(v,zjn) i^ g(v)-h(2Jn)
The bidder's profit is a random variable which depends on the item's
value, the amount bid, and whether the auction is won or lost:
-rrCb) = V - b, if b > z;
•rr(b) = 0, if b < z.
The expected value of profit is given by:
+<» b
E[iT(b)] = / / (y-b)'f (v,2jn) dz dy. (3.1)
— OO —CO
Expected profit is maximized by tendering the amount b* that equates the
derivative of (3.1) to zero:
+00 +« b*
~E[7r(b)] = / (y-b*)«f(v,b*) dy - / / f(y.z) dz dy
b*
= h(b*|n).E[(v-bA)lz=b*] - H(b*|n) = 0. (3.2)
This condition can be v/ritten equivalently as:
Mb^lsi = I . (3.3)
K(b*{n) - V - b* '
where v = E[vjz=b*]. That is, v equals the posterior expectation of v,
conditional upon the knowledge that the highest competing bid among a
group of size n is no greater than b*.
It is apparent froai (3.3) that a necessary restriction on b* is

_Q_
above. Hopefull3/, our theorem on the behavior of the posterior
valuation as it is affected by the level of competition, and the
relation of this value to the optimal bid, will clarify the motivation
for such behavior.
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that b* <^ V. This condition has a quite intuitive interpretation; the
bidder must tender a bid that does not exceed his posterior appraisal of
the item's value, conditional on the knowledge that he has won it.
Moreover, this relation between b* and v accounts for the possibility
of a non-aggressive response to increased competition. This is because
the posterior appraisal, v, falls within the domain of our theorem on
ordering, and can be shown to decrease as the number of competitors
increases. Consequently, if the bidder were to maintain his previous
bid, b*, in the face of increased competition, then his prospective profit,
v-b*, would diminish. A reasonable response would be for him to reduce
the amount of his bid in order to maintain profit at a reasonable level,
even if this entails a higher probability of losing the auction.
Of course, the advent of additioaal competitors decreases the
probability of winning even if the previous bid were sustained, so one
could argue conversely that to maintain a reasonable probability of
winning, the bidder should increase the amount of his bid. Which of
these countervailing forces v/ill dominate depends on the relative
degree of uncertainty surrounding the unknown value of the item (referred
to as commercial risk) , as opposed to the amount of the highest competing
bid (referred to as competitive risk ) . The conditions under which
commercial risk would dominate and lead to a non-aggressive competitive
response have been outlined elsewhere by this author (1978) . Based on
that theoretical analysis, we should expect to observe the non-aggressive
response in many of the auction markets active in the United States
economy. Of course, the non-aggressive response has also been recommended
on the basis of the simulation studies of real-worl auction markets cited
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FOOTNOTES
Since the competing bid distribution is assumed continuous throughout,
the probability of a tie is zero and we need not specify a tie-breaker
rule. We also abstract from possible costs of preparing and submitting
the bid.
2
ITo apply the theorem we need only interpret the function ^(^le) as
the subjective distribution function assigned to each competitor's
bid, where 6 now represents the item's true underlying value; and
stipulate that ^CSlS,) > "^CCJe-) whenever 6, < 8-. That is, the prob-i ^ 1 /
ability of observing large bids is assumed to decrease whenever the
item's underlying value decreases.
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